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Abstract
The U.S. military, despite spending over $13 billion, appears powerless to stop the Iraqi
insurgency’s improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which cause most of the military’s
casualties and prevent victory by showing lawlessness and insecurity. However, this view
ignores substitution effects we consider here. Using rational choice and expectations
models, we find a backward-bending supply curve of attacks – insurgents increase the
resources for IED attacks when IEDs are made less effective, but must therefore reduce
non-IED attacks 2% for every 1% decrease in IED effectiveness. The success of the
counter-IED effort has thus been significantly underestimated.
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I. Introduction
This paper presents an economic analysis of one major component of the war in Iraq –
the battle against improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Economic analysis of warfare has
been an active area of research for decades (e.g. Schelling (1960)), and has been applied
to insurgency (e.g. Leites and Wolf (1970)), terrorism (e.g. Enders and Sandler (2006),
Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1991), Jaeger and Paserman (2006), Rosendorff and Sandler
(2004), Sandler and Enders (2002)), and specifically the war in Iraq (e.g. Davis, Murphy and
Topel (2006)). We present empirical results of maximizing behavior in the Iraqi insurgency,
its relation to microeconomic theory, and implications for the fight against IEDs.
Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the insurgency that has arisen to fight the
Coalition has killed and wounded thousands of U.S. soldiers.1 Of the deaths, most have
been killed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs, also known as roadside bombs,
are a “device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destuctive, lethal,
noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass,
or distract.”2
The United States military has spent a great deal of its resources on combating IEDs.
The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), an agency unifying the efforts of all the
military services to defeat these bombs, has received over $13 billion in funding since 2004.
JIEDDO and the overall counter-IED effort have been criticized for their apparent inability
to stop or even reduce the number of IED attacks. A Boston Globe news article referred to
JIEDDO as “the controversial office that has spent billions of dollars but failed to curb the
biggest killer of American troops,” and noted that “lawmakers have become increasingly
frustrated by its secrecy and apparent lack of progress in stemming the roadside bomb
threat.”3 However, no analysis has yet estimated the impact of IED countermeasures on
other types of attacks, which are causally linked due to resource constraints. Because
1The Coalition is made up of 33 nations, but the United States has contributed the overwhelming majority
of the troops and funding from the initial occupation to the present day.
2Definition from the Joint IED Defeat Organization.
3Bender, Bryan, “War strategy critic to review IED office,” Boston Globe, April 16, 2007.
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insurgents do not have infinite resources, if a countermeasure increases the resources required
for an effective attack, ceteris paribus, it decreases the resources available for non-IED
attacks.
In this analysis, we consider the income and substitution effects from a decrease in IED
effectiveness. To identify the results of a shift in the cost of conducting IED attacks, we
use the variation in the percentage of IED attacks that are effective, which changes the
resources necessary to conduct an effective IED attack. Considering the graph presented in
Figure 1, IED attacks appear to increase with a decrease in the percentage of IED attacks
that are effective – a situation analogous to the backward-bending supply curve of labor,
where hours worked can increase with a decrease in wages. If the insurgents are resource-
constrained, the increase in the number of IED attacks attempted comes at the cost of other
types of attacks.
If IED attacks decrease with a decrease in IED effectiveness, evaluations of the counter-
IED effort that do not consider its impact on non-IED attacks have overstated the counter-
IED effort’s success (because they do not consider the additional non-IED attacks that
result). If IED attacks increase with an increase in IED effectiveness, however, evaluations of
the counter-IED effort that do not consider its impact on non-IED attacks have understated
the counter-IED effort’s success (because they do not consider the decrease in non-IED
attacks that results).
[Figure 1 about here]
When countermeasures reduce the returns to an attack (and increase the resources re-
quired for success), they are likely to change insurgent behavior. Benmelech and Berrebi
(2007) found that Palestinian organizations conducting suicide bombings engage in opti-
mizing behavior – bombers with higher levels of human capital are assigned to higher-value
targets. Enders and Sandler (1993), studying transnational terrorism, found that metal
detectors in airports and the hardening of buildings decreased skyjackings and attacks
against embassies but increased hostage-taking and assassinations – close substitutes for
transnational terrorists. These empirical results suggest that various kinds of transnational
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terrorism, on a single-good basis, will decrease with a decrease in effectiveness.
We demonstrate below that a Coalition countermeasure, which we identify through its
effect on insurgent trigger use, which reduces the probability that an IED attack will be
effective has no statistically significant impact on the number of observed IED attacks the
insurgents conduct. However, these innovations do reduce the number of non-IED attacks.
We also show that a decrease in the resources of the insurgency causes the insurgents to
do proportionally more IED attacks. Because IED attacks, unlike transnational terrorist
attacks, do not decrease with a decrease in effectiveness, the effects of the countermeasures
deployed by the U.S. military have been significantly understated.
II. Theory, Data, and Methodology
We develop here a model of the levels of IED attacks and non-IED attacks selected by
the insurgents.4 Adapting the choice-theoretic model of Landes (1978):
E[UI ] = pIUI,S + (1− pI)UI,F (1)
where E[UI ] is the expected utility increase if the insurgents attempt an IED attack, pI
is the probability that an IED attack will be effective, UI,S is the utility from an effective
IED attack, and UI,F is the utility from an unsuccessful (ineffective or found and cleared)
IED attack, with UI,S > UI,F . Insurgents conduct a marginal IED attack if E[UI ] exceeds
the cost of an IED attack, which we denote below as a, and a marginal non-IED attack if
E[UN ] > b for the cost of a non-IED attack b.5
For a fixed number of attempted IED or non-IED attacks I,N , the number of effective
attacks is distributed according to IS ∼ Binomial(I, pI), NS ∼ Binomial(N, pN ), with
4The problem is analogous to insurgent groups as consumers of IED and non-IED attacks, or insurgent
groups as producers of damage with IED and non-IED attacks as inputs. We do not attempt to distinguish
between the different cases, because both can generate what we term here the income and substitution effects,
and the implications of these effects are interpreted the same way regardless of whether the insurgency is
considered to be consumers or producers.
5Note that utility can include non-kinetic effects such as public relations problems for the Coalition –
such effects are one reason why UI,F and UN,F may be positive.
4
expected values E[IS ] = pII,E[NS ] = pNN . Using this formulation to expand the choice-
theoretic model to the aggregate number of IED attacks and non-IED attacks attempted,
we can therefore presume that insurgents maximize the damage they inflict on the Coalition
subject to resource constraints:
max E[U(I,N)] (2)
s.t. aI + bN ≤ R (3)
where U is a utility function that increases monotonically with the number of IED attacks I
and the number of non-IED attacks N , R is the resources available to the insurgents, and a
and b represent resources expended for an attempted IED attack or an attempted non-IED
attack. With limited assumptions on the behavior of this system,6 it is analogous to a
consumer maximizing utility by selecting a bundle of goods or a firm maximizing output.
Relabel the expected resources expended per effective IED attack as f = apI and per
effective non-IED attack as g = bpN , assuming a and b constant – this allows the probabilities
of effectiveness for IED and non-IED attacks to enter the equations directly. With this
change, the solution to the maximization problem can be written as
I¯ = I¯(f, g,R) (4)
N¯ = N¯(f, g,R) (5)
λ¯ = λ¯(f, g,R) (6)
with λ as the Lagrange multiplier, interpreted as the marginal insurgent utility resulting
6Diminishing marginal returns to IED and non-IED attacks, and little or no complementary effects of
damage across IED and non-IED attacks.
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from additional resources. The comparative-static derivatives are7
∂I¯/∂R = (gDIN − fDNN ) /det(H¯) (7)
∂N¯/∂R = (fDIN − gDII) /det(H¯) (8)
and
∂I¯/∂f = −g2λ¯/det(H¯)− I¯ · (∂I¯/∂R) (9)
∂N¯/∂f = fgλ¯/det(H¯)− I¯ · (∂N¯/∂R) (10)
We do not directly observe the cost of an IED or non-IED attack, denoted above as a
and b. However, changes in the benefits of an attempt from changes in effectiveness are
observable. We therefore can investigate the effect of an exogenous decrease in the benefit
of conducting an IED attack – an exogenous decrease in IED effectiveness pI . According to
the choice-theoretic model outlined above, a decrease in the benefits has exactly the same
effect on the number of IED attacks conducted as some increase in the costs would have.
We can therefore treat a decrease in the benefits of attempting IED attacks exactly as we
would treat an increase in the cost.8
In the above formulations, the quantities I¯ · (∂I¯/∂R) and I¯ · (∂N¯/∂R) are the income
effect from changes in price, and −g2λ¯/det(H¯) and fgλ¯/det(H¯) are the substitution effect.
Note that the number of IED attacks could increase or decrease in response to a change in
f . An increase could be the result of behavior analogous to tbe backward-bending supply
curve of labor – if the insurgents are “targeting” a certain level of attacks (which can result
from marginal returns to IED attacks decreasing with the level of IED attacks), a decrease
in IED effectiveness will cause an increase in the number of IED attacks, and a decrease in
the number of non-IED attacks. In order to test this hypothesis, we estimate these effects
7We use subscripts here to indicate a partial derivative.
8There is no data available on the number of effective non-IED attacks, so the model is incomplete if the
goods considered are effective attacks rather than attempted attacks.
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through Equations 4 and 5 using publicly available data from U.S. government sources. A
detailed description of the data collection is presented in the Data Appendix. A time-series
plot of the total number of IED attacks and the number of effective IED attacks is presented
in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here]
In order to make these reduced-form equations operational, we use the effectiveness of
IED attacks (contemporaneously and with one lag) as a measure of changes in the price
(the resources required) to carry out IED attacks. There has been no systematic effort
on the scale of JIEDDO to reduce the effectiveness of non-IED attacks, so we therefore
assume that this change can be appropriately modeled by a linear trend.9 As a proxy for
the resource constraint, we use the numbers of IED and non-IED attacks in the previous
period.10 To allow for differing autoregressive effects, we split these into two variables in
each equation.11
The effectiveness of IED and non-IED attacks may be endogenous – in particular, they
may vary simultaneously with the number of IED and non-IED attacks attempted. Further-
more, there may exist correlations between the effectiveness of IED attacks and non-IED
attacks. We therefore require an instrument that is exogenous.
IEDs are triggered with a variety of systems – by radio control, command wire, pressure
plate (similar to a landmine), passive infrared sensors, or cell phones. Contemporaneously,
the percentage of IEDs that are not triggered by radio control are exogenous once past IED
effectiveness (the factor that determines what types of attacks to attempt this period) is
controlled for. The percentage of non-radio-control triggers used is determined by Coalition
jammer use, which is not a function of contemporaneous insurgent activity.
9We tested quadratic trends, but did not reject the null hypothesis of no significance.
10Although this proxy may introduce measurement error, the instruments for the effectiveness of IED
attacks are likely to be exogenous with respect to the resource constraint, and therefore allow identification
of variation due to changes in IED effectiveness rather than in the resource constraint. The results may
therefore be less susceptible to the adverse effects of measurement error due to the use of these instrumental
variables.
11As noted in the empirical results, we also tested the use of Iraqi prison population as a proxy for total
insurgent resources, and did not reject the null hypothesis of no significant information.
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Jammer use is, perhaps paradoxically, exogenous with respect to IED and non-IED at-
tacks. Coalition forces use all the IED countermeasures available to them since the marginal
cost is extremely low, and the available IED countermeasures are the result of spending de-
cisions made in previous periods. The marginal cost of additional use of IED jamming
systems once they have been fielded is only the electrical power to operate them. Although
it is possible that these systems could be deployed in anticipation of higher insurgent ef-
fectiveness in the future (making jammer use endogenous), JIEDDO has been criticized for
being too slow to react to insurgent innovations. A paper written by three field-grade mil-
itary officers, Ellis, Rodgers and Cochran (2007), describes JIEDDO as being mired in red
tape and unable to effectively respond to new developments in insurgent IED technology.12
Similar issues are raised in Adamson (2007) – authored by the former operations officer of
JIEDDO. While JIEDDO has been able to identify some trends in the counter-IED fight,
it is virtually impossible to predict insurgent activity, and the long lag in acquisition deci-
sions to deployment of systems prevents these systems from being endogenous responses to
contemporaneous insurgent activity. We therefore assume that jammer use is exogenous.
We also assume that insurgents cannot detect changes in countermeasures activity, for-
mulate a response, and execute that response in the same period. Therefore, the decisions
about what trigger use to attempt are not a function of contemporaneous countermeasures
use. However, the triggers actually observed are a function of countermeasures use, which
is exogenous. The use of jammers prevents radio frequency emissions that could trigger an
IED. When a jammer is successful, those attempted attacks are not observed because the
IED does not detonate. This effect necessarily reduces the observed radio control detonated
IEDs and causes a higher proportion of non-radio control triggers to be in the population
of observed IEDs. Therefore, use of jammers results in a contemporaneous reduction in
the percentage of IEDs observed using radio control triggers. We can use this association
between non-radio control trigger use and IED effectiveness to represent the decrease in
IED effectiveness due to jammer use.
12This paper is at http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current students/documents policies/documents/jca cca awsp/.
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In order to control for innovations in insurgent technology (which may have both direct
and spillover effects), we use passive infrared trigger use as a proxy. These triggers are
generally used only with explosively formed penetrator IEDs, which, although they are
highly lethal, require a high degree of technical sophistication to construct and emplace.
We therefore estimate a contemporaneous instrumental variable (IV) model:
∆̂It = α0 + α1∆̂Et + α2∆Et−1 + α3∆It−1 + α4∆Nt−1 + 1 (11)
∆̂Nt = β0 + β1∆̂Et + β2∆Et−1 + β3∆It−1 + β4∆Nt−1 + 2 (12)
∆̂Et = γ0 + γ1∆GCW,t + γ2∆GPP,t + γ3∆GIR,t + γ4∆GCP,t + 3 (13)
where I is the number of IED incidents, N is the number of non-IED attacks, E is the
average effectiveness of an IED attack, GCW is observed command wire triggers, GPP is
observed pressure plate triggers, GIR is observed passive infrared triggers, and GCP is
observed cell phone triggers. ∆̂Et and ∆Et−1 are proxies for f , while ∆It−1 and ∆Nt−1 are
proxies for R in Equations 4 and 5. The 1, 2, 3 are the equation error terms, which are
assumed to be serially uncorrelated. However, as discussed below, we allow correlations to
exist across the different equations in the same time period, and account for this using a
system estimation procedure that increases efficiency.
As a check on the robustness of the specification to problems such as endogeneity of
the instruments, we also specify a simple dynamic rational expectations model using or-
thogonality conditions. Suppose that the insurgents use an optimal forecast function h to
predict the effectiveness of IED attacks, and choose their levels of IED and non-IED attacks
accordingly. Then the difference between the insurgents’ forecast and the realization of IED
effectiveness at time t is uncorrelated with any variables observed at time t − 1. We can
therefore generate orthogonality conditions for an alternative estimate of Equation 13,
E [(∆Et −∆h (Xt−1))⊗Xt−1] = 0
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where ⊗ is the Kronecker product and Xt−1 is a vector of information observed at time
t − 1. For Xt−1, we use lags of the instruments (trigger use, past effectiveness) from the
contemporaneous IV specification, and for h, we use a linear forecast. This specification
corresponds to the instrumental variable specification above, but with lagged rather than
contemporaneous instruments.
The equation error terms are almost certainly correlated: the whole point of this analysis
is that an insurgent group choosing to conduct one more IED attack necessarily cannot
conduct as many non-IED attacks, and vice versa. We therefore use system estimation
methods to increase efficiency. We conducted estimation using both the three-stage least
squares (3SLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The two estimates
produced very similar results for parameter estimates. GMM standard errors may be biased
in small samples; we therefore present below the 3SLS estimates for the two models.
III. Empirical Results
We find that all of the series appear to be unit root processes.13 Therefore, we estimate
the relationships in first differences.14 All variables except the instruments (which take on
zero values) are expressed in logarithms.
The specification is robust to the removal of some variables (for example, the effective-
ness variables in the IED equation), but the estimates vary wildly when the constants are
excluded. As the constants are one of the proxies used for total insurgent resources (thereby
representing a linear trend in levels), this effect is likely due to omitted variable bias. As a
robustness check on the quality of the proxies for total insurgent strength (the linear trends
and autoregressive terms), we also tested the specification with the inclusion of a trend in
the differences specification (a quadratic trend in levels) and variables for the size of the
Iraqi prison population over time.15 These variables were jointly insignificant, so they were
13Testing was done with the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the efficient unit root test outlined in Elliot,
Rothenberg and Stock (1996). Both showed a strong probability of the presence of a unit root.
14There is little evidence that any cointegrating relationships exist in the data.
15These estimates can be found in the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index at
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omitted in the specification below to increase efficiency.16
Estimation of the contemporaneous IV model produces:
∆̂It = 0.054∗∗
(0.021)
+ 0.031
(0.260)
∆̂Et + 0.076
(0.142)
∆Et−1 − 0.310
(0.195)
∆It−1 − 0.069
(0.065)
∆Nt−1 (14)(
T = 34 R¯2 = 0.115 σˆ = 0.115
)
∆̂Nt = 0.116∗
(0.061)
+ 1.281∗
(0.757)
∆̂Et + 0.757∗
(0.414)
∆Et−1 − 1.001∗
(0.566)
∆It−1 − 0.170
(0.188)
∆Nt−1 (15)(
T = 34 R¯2 = 0.240 σˆ = 0.334
)
(standard errors in parentheses)
** significant at the 5% confidence level
* significant at the 10% confidence level
Estimation of the dynamic rational expectations model produces:
∆̂It = 0.059∗∗
(0.024)
+ 0.046
(0.204)
∆̂Et + 0.021
(0.142)
∆Et−1 − 0.370∗
(0.195)
∆It−1 − 0.052
(0.066)
∆Nt−1 (16)(
T = 33 R¯2 = 0.152 σˆ = 0.114
)
∆̂Nt = 0.176∗∗
(0.083)
+ 2.709∗
(1.386)
∆̂Et + 0.633
(0.494)
∆Et−1 − 1.209∗
(0.681)
∆It−1 − 0.079
(0.230)
∆Nt−1 (17)(
T = 33 R¯2 = −0.034 σˆ = 0.395)
(standard errors in parentheses)
** significant at the 5% confidence level
* significant at the 10% confidence level
Tests of the residuals for normality and the absence of serial correlation, as well as tests
for the validity of the overidentifying restrictions, suggest that the models are well-specified.
http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx. We used linear interpolation for the missing data
points.
16Specifying the model using only the differenced Iraqi prison population variable instead of the constants
and autoregressive effects results in qualitatively similar coefficient estimates, though without statistical sig-
nificance. We attribute these results to omitted variable bias from excluding those variables. Specifying the
model with all these variables included also results in qualitatively similar coefficient estimates, but with no
variables individually significant. We attribute this result to decreased efficiency from an overparameterized
model with moderate collinearity in the proxies.
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We present the results of the Anderson-Darling test for normality of the residuations in
Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6.
[Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 about here]
We present in Table 1 the results of tests for the significance of α1 + α2 and β1 + β2,
representing our hypothesized effects over two months. We accept the null hypothesis of
no effect of IED effectiveness on IED attacks, but a positive effect of IED effectiveness on
non-IED attacks.
[Table 1 about here]
The two models produce congruent results, as evidenced by Figure 7. The ellipses
present the cross-equation confidence ellipses, while the gray area represents the single-
equation significance of the IED and non-IED coefficients in the contemporaneous IV model,
and the dashed gray lines represent the single-equation significance of the IED and non-
IED coefficients in the dynamic rational expectations model. Each model’s point estimate is
within the other’s 95% confidence region. Both models find a magnitude- and statistically-
significant effect of IED effectiveness on non-IED attacks, but not on IED attacks.
[Figure 7 about here]
IV. Discussion
The key question for this analysis is the interpretation of the sums α̂1+ α̂2 and β̂1+ β̂2.
These sums represent the effect, over two months, of a change in IED effectiveness on
IED and non-IED attacks, respectively.17 Results from this model suggest that a major
way IED countermeasures are effective is in reducing non-IED attacks. The model finds
that a 1% decrease in IED effectiveness decreases non-IED attacks by 2%-3% (the sum
of the estimated coefficients β̂1 and β̂2). In response to a Coalition negative effectiveness
17We do not discount an attack prevented by reduced effectiveness next month more than an attack
prevented by reduced effectiveness this month, which is why the sums α̂1+α̂2 and β̂1+β̂2 are left unweighted
relative to each other.
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innovation, insurgents increase the number of IED attacks conducted (and because the
proportion of unobserved IED attacks is higher, the number of observed IED attacks remains
approximately the same – manifested by the coefficients in Equations 14 and 16 being
insignificant). Therefore, IED countermeasures will appear to have no deterring effect
against IED attacks, and in fact, both the number of effective attacks and the number
of casualties due to IEDs will appear stable. However, analysis of these first-order effects
ignore the additional resources required to inflict casualties.
Because additional resources are now required to inflict the same number of casualties,
fewer resources are available, ceteris paribus, to carry out non-IED attacks. As shown
below, this effect is the primary mechanism by which IED countermeasures are effective,
for the response of non-IED attacks to a decrease in IED effectiveness is large: 2.04 in the
contemporaneous IV model and 3.34 in the dynamic rational expectations model (β̂1+ β̂2).
We use the constant term as a proxy for total insurgent resources. We find that, ceteris
paribus the ability of insurgents to conduct IED attacks increases by 5%-6% per month,
while the ability of insurgents to conduct non-IED attacks increases by 11%-17% per month.
These increases may be due to increases in the amount of resources available to the insur-
gents, or technological progress that allows the insurgents greater efficiency in conducting
these attacks.
In order to estimate the total effect IED countermeasures have had on non-IED attacks,
we estimate the effect Coalition countermeasures have had, as measured through the instru-
ments. An OLS regression of IED effectiveness on the instruments returns the coefficients
determining ∆Et (we present here the contemporaneous IV model’s estimates). Using these
coefficients, it is possible to recover an estimate of the total effect IED countermeasures,
as measured through decreases in IED effectiveness, have had on non-IED attacks. With
the contemporaneous IV estimate of a response of 2.04, we find that these countermeasures
have prevented 1,710 non-IED attacks.
The first-order effect that these countermeasures have had (turning what would have
been effective IED attacks into ineffective IED attacks) is estimated, using the above OLS
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regression of Equation 13, to be 1,504 IED attacks. These estimates show that the number
of non-IED attacks prevented by IED countermeasures actually exceeds the number of IED
attacks rendered ineffective by them. Furthermore, the countermeasures have no significant
effect in reducing the number of IED attacks the insurgents attempt – they only reduce
non-IED attacks in the data observed.
While these differences may seem small relative to the overall amount of money spent
in the counter-IED fight, these estimates represent lower bounds on the effectiveness of
IED countermeasures. We consider only jammers, a subset of the total counter-IED effort.
There may be changes in Coalition techniques, tactics, and procedures, or innovations that
reduce the expected number of casualties inflicted when casualties are taken. The actual
impact of the overall counter-IED effort on non-IED attacks is likely to be considerably
higher than the estimates presented here.
V. Conclusion
We have estimated the responses of the levels of IED and non-IED attacks selected by in-
surgents in Iraq to increased Coalition countermeasures, using contemporaneous and lagged
IED trigger use as instruments for IED effectiveness. We find that IED countermeasures
have no significant impact in reducing the number of IED attacks conducted, but they do
reduce the number of non-IED attacks the insurgency conducts. We find that a one percent
decrease in IED effectiveness due to countermeasures decreases non-IED attacks by at least
two percent, and that IED countermeasures have thus prevented the insurgency from car-
rying out at least 1,710 non-IED attacks it otherwise would have. The number of non-IED
attacks prevented exceeds the number of IED attacks rendered ineffective by the counter-
measures, suggesting that the effectiveness of the $13 billion spent on IED countermeasures
has been significantly understated.
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Data Appendix
The data used are time series for the number of effective (defined as attacks that kill or
wound at least one Coalition soldier) and ineffective IED attacks per month, the number of
IEDs found and cleared, the total number of IED attacks per month, the number of total
attacks per month (all methods), and the monthly percentages used of six IED triggers.
The total number of IED attacks is defined to be the sum of ineffective and effective IED
attacks plus the number of IEDs found and cleared. The number of non-IED attacks is the
difference of the number of total attacks and the total number of IED attacks. Effectiveness
is defined as the number of effective IED attacks divided by the number of total IED
incidents (including IEDs found and cleared).18 The sample is June 2004-April 2007.
The data on the total number of attacks per month are from Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated
Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq’s Oil and Electricity Sectors (2007). The data
on the number of effective, ineffective, and found/cleared IED incidents per month, as well
as the time series for the six triggers observed, come from a Joint IED-Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) PowerPoint briefing.19 In both cases, the data is collected from graphs in the
documents.20 Although the scale bars on the graphs have been removed in the PowerPoint
presentation and in the GAO report, the numbers can be inferred from reports which
have stated several monthly numbers of IED attacks. Furthermore, the measurement error
inherent in this process is considerably smaller than even the differences in the counts of IED
attacks kept by different U.S. Department of Defense agencies. In this way, it is possible to
create a highly accurate representation of trends in the IED fight from entirely unclassified,
public data. 21
18JIEDDO defines an effective attack as one that produces casualties.
19The briefing can be found on the Department of Defense website http://www.acq.osd.mil/ic/.
20Although the data underlying these graphs is classified, the data on the graphs can be interpolated with
better than 95% precision based on the size of the pixels – therefore, measurement error above and beyond
any errors that may exist in the underlying data is very limited. Interpolation was conducted by counting
the pixels on the graphs and generating an attacks per pixel value from several monthly values publicly
announced by the Coalition.
21As a check on the quality of the data, the interpolated data agree closely with data presented in Atkinson
(2007). Atkinson also identifies the six triggers: low-power radio control, high-power radio control, passive
infrared, command wire, pressure plate, and cell phone.
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Abbreviations
IED: Improvised Explosive Device
IV: Instrumental Variables
JIEDDO: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
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Figure 1: IED Attacks and IED Effectiveness.
Table 1: Wald Coefficient Tests for Significance of IED Effectiveness.
Model H0 χ2(1) p-value
Contemporaneous IV α1 + α2 = 0 0.1051 0.7458
Contemporaneous IV β1 + β2 = 0 4.5116 0.0337
Dynamic Rational Expectations α1 + α2 = 0 0.0238 0.8775
Dynamic Rational Expectations β1 + β2 = 0 4.9012 0.0268
19
Figure 2: Total IED Incidents and Effective IED Incidents.
20
Figure 3: Anderson-Darling Test for Normality, Contemporaneous IV IED
Equation.
21
Figure 4: Anderson-Darling Test for Normality, Contemporaneous IV Non-IED
Equation.
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Figure 5: Anderson-Darling Test for Normality, Dynamic Rational Expectations
IED Equation.
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Figure 6: Anderson-Darling Test for Normality, Dynamic Rational Expectations
Non-IED Equation.
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Figure 7: 95% Confidence Regions, Cross- and Single-Equation Estimates.
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Table 2: Interpolated Data.
Month LPRC HPRC PI CW PP CP IED-FC IED-I IED-E IED NIED
6/04 0.674 0.295 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.000 350 305 125 780 860
7/04 0.560 0.440 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 290 300 165 755 925
8/04 0.571 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 340 350 205 895 1985
9/04 0.477 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.000 350 395 190 935 1125
10/04 0.442 0.537 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 420 500 205 1125 1235
11/04 0.317 0.674 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 505 610 255 1370 1390
12/04 0.247 0.741 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 450 485 140 1075 865
1/05 0.429 0.548 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 620 625 175 1420 1360
2/05 0.160 0.830 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 515 545 160 1220 500
3/05 0.176 0.774 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 575 490 145 1210 330
4/05 0.180 0.788 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.000 570 615 210 1395 345
5/05 0.098 0.878 0.008 0.000 0.015 0.000 610 680 210 1500 600
6/05 0.069 0.873 0.029 0.000 0.029 0.000 550 615 190 1355 685
7/05 0.060 0.878 0.017 0.000 0.044 0.000 540 815 205 1560 780
8/05 0.050 0.849 0.006 0.000 0.095 0.000 595 850 210 1655 905
9/05 0.060 0.838 0.021 0.000 0.081 0.000 565 900 225 1690 790
10/05 0.019 0.755 0.044 0.000 0.181 0.000 785 990 245 2020 1000
11/05 0.014 0.736 0.025 0.000 0.222 0.004 790 730 140 1660 380
12/05 0.029 0.616 0.012 0.000 0.344 0.000 830 830 155 1815 665
1/06 0.025 0.635 0.017 0.147 0.141 0.035 780 645 140 1565 615
2/06 0.006 0.600 0.006 0.156 0.133 0.098 910 735 140 1785 595
3/06 0.021 0.573 0.006 0.154 0.156 0.089 1135 780 160 2075 805
4/06 0.019 0.488 0.037 0.085 0.224 0.147 1130 860 190 2180 1060
5/06 0.015 0.467 0.029 0.091 0.224 0.174 1215 1055 230 2500 1100
6/06 0.017 0.442 0.037 0.104 0.309 0.091 1155 1045 260 2460 1120
7/06 0.025 0.280 0.033 0.191 0.346 0.125 1230 1165 245 2640 1680
8/06 0.017 0.328 0.017 0.284 0.286 0.068 1275 1215 215 2705 1455
9/06 0.015 0.311 0.019 0.326 0.255 0.073 1365 1275 265 2905 2015
10/06 0.021 0.297 0.012 0.309 0.292 0.069 1375 1505 275 3155 2225
11/06 0.039 0.241 0.008 0.363 0.299 0.050 1395 1185 220 2800 1900
12/06 0.025 0.164 0.019 0.382 0.342 0.068 1305 1280 255 2840 2120
1/07 0.025 0.139 0.012 0.477 0.284 0.064 1235 1165 225 2625 2435
2/07 0.054 0.151 0.008 0.450 0.263 0.075 1465 1050 190 2705 1775
3/07 0.066 0.120 0.012 0.461 0.286 0.056 1645 1205 205 3055 1745
4/07 0.068 0.124 0.029 0.486 0.222 0.071 1415 1265 225 2905 1915
LPRC/HPRC: Low Power/High Power Radio Control
PI: Passive Infrared
CW: Command Wire
PP: Pressure Plate
CP: Cell Phone
IED-FC: IEDs Found/Cleared
IED-I: Ineffective IEDs
IED-E: Effective IEDs
IED: Total IED Attacks
NIED: Total Non-IED Attacks
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